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At the German Space Operations Center (GSOC), a new generation of monitoring and 
control software has been put to operations, as well for the antenna hardware at GSOC's  
ground station in Weilheim, as for the internal communication network infrastructure of the 
control center in Oberpfaffenhofen. While keeping operations ongoing and trying to create 
monitoring tools looking familiar to the experienced long-term operators, DLR also tries to 
improve operations by innovative concepts. Beside our intention for progress, new concepts 
have become necessary by the growing complexity of the systems in use and even more by 
the rapidly increasing amount of monitoring information provided by these systems. This 
paper describes, how the way to display a complex system has changed with the new M&C-
tool, and its impact to operations and operators.
Nomenclature
M&C = A system to remotely monitor and control some given hardware equipment on ground.
SpACE = A generic M&C-framework developed at GSOC.
WARP = Weilheim Antenna Remote Processing, the M&C used at Weilheim ground station as antenna control.
NEMO = Network Monitoring, the M&C used to control the IT-infrastructure at GSOC.
I. Concepts Of Operations – Procedures, Skills ans Tools
ny discussion about operations and concepts of operations starts with a broad consensus: The monitoring tool 
in use shall display “green” as long as the system is nominal, and it must change to yellow or red in abnormal 
situations. The sheer simplicity of this requirement often leads to the misunderstanding that operations already is  
defined by this sentence. In fact, it is not for two reasons: First, the requirements for a complex system to be in 
nominal condition most often do not have hard boundaries. They are soft in the sense, that some deviations are 
acceptable under certain conditions, they do not play a role for certain actions and so on. The exercise to translate  
such an interpretation of the system and its current task as a whole into pure logic that can be coded in software and  
then ultimately leads to a single green or red signal on the top-level display is the Holy Grail of any monitoring 
system. The second piece missing to precisely define operations is the definition of the operator's reaction in case of 
failure. This task is not that much a technical problem than a conceptual one. Is failure an option? In other words,  
does the service to be provided has to be up for 95% or for 99.99%? How is the relation between utilization of the 
system and spare time for trouble shooting balanced? How much is invested in expertise of the operators and/or in 
the immediate availability and presence of experts? All these boundary conditions have a significant impact on the 
needs how a system monitoring tool displays the situation. And even worse, they might differ in time, while the  
same hardware is utilized for different tasks.
A
Most often, all of the conditions mentioned above are set externally and can not be changed. The main variables 
that can be adjusted to match the needs are the procedures handed to the operators and the training of the operators.  
At GSOC's ground station in Weilheim we are in a fortunate situation that we also can easily adjust the monitoring 
and control tool in use, named WARP – a short for Weilheim Antenna Remote Processing – as it is based on an in-
house developed M&C-framework. In fact it was the invention of this new M&C-system that triggered us to rethink 
the concepts of operations.
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A. Multi-Mission Operations at GSOC's Ground Station inWeilheim
Weilheim, located about 50 km south of Munich, Germany, performs as ground station for spacecraft operations 
since 1968. Besides hosting dedicated antennas exclusively in use for a single project, Weilheim ground station  
operates six antennas in multi-mission context. There are 3 antennas for receiving and transmitting signals in S-
band, two of them with 15 m in diameter, the third one with 9 m. A fourth antenna, 11 m in diameter, is prepared to 
receive and transmit signals in Ku-band, and a fifth of size 13 m works in Ka-band. All of them are full-motion 
antennas optimized to follow quickly moving targets, they are capable of receiving and transmitting signals, and all 
can be operated in autotrack-mode. The sixth antenna, a dish with 30 m in diameter, is designed to operate in L-, S- 
and X-band. This last one at the moment is equipped as a receive-only antenna.
The tasks fulfilled by those antennas range from routine TT&C-operations for LEO-satellites, primarily done in  
S-band, over LEOP-supports in all frequency regimes for LEO- and GEO-satellites, to IOT-campaigns, the first one  
in Ka-band successfully completed in March 2014. All these antennas also are used for R&D-work. Especially the  
largest antenna, the 30 m-dish, is utilized for various test-campaigns, because of its easy access to the feed-system 
and the possibility to exchange and adjust the connected RF-equipment. Some conditions for operations can be 
derived from this portfolio of activities:
• As used for special  tasks in critical mission phases, all equipment is highly redundant and the antenna  
hardware is designed such, that operation is still possible, even if several parts of the equipment fails. As an 
example, the up-link chain for transmitting signals is not only redundant in the sense, that two independent 
chains exist. The signal path can also be crossed from one chain to the other between base-band devices  
and frequency-converters, as well as between frequency-converters and high-power amplifiers. Therefore 
the system is robust not only against single failures, but in turn, it is more complex.
• The location in mid latitudes only allows for much less contacts to LEO-satellites compared to ground  
stations located much closer to the polar regions. This leads to a much less utilization of the station, but in  
turn allows for longer preparation phases. Thus the focus for operations is laid to reliability in favor over  
time-efficiency.
• Depending on the orbits of the serviced satellites, there are sometimes periods with ten and more visibilities  
within few hours, followed by a time-slot of about ten hours without any contact. Such time-slots are used  
at Weilheim for R&D-work at the antenna hardware. Contrary to routine operation, where the performed 
action is more or less always the same but only configured for the given satellite, the R&D-work might  
alter settings never touched before or even temporarily change the hardware setup. Being executed by 
humans, there is  always  the risk that  the system is not brought  back to its  nominal setup in terms of 
hardware and settings. To ensure the desired quality of service under these circumstances, a complete and 
thorough system-test is needed well ahead the next support, again exchanging time for reliability.
The scheduling for Weilheim ground station usually preserves a time-slot of 20 minutes prior to AOS for setup 
and testing. For each support an internal data-flow-test is performed to assure the correct settings of the equipment.  
The sequence to set up the equipment is optimized not in speed but in reliability. Settings are verified in monitoring  
as  well  as  by functional  tests.  That  way,  malfunctions are  identified ahead  in  time of  the  support.  In  case  of  
problems, a system engineer can fix the hardware, the support can be run on redundant hardware within the antenna 
or the whole support still can be completely re-scheduled to another antenna. Such, the main task for the operator is  
to assure prior to a scheduled support that the necessary equipment does work properly.  In case it does not, the  
operator has to judge which action is needed and he has to initiate this action, either by configuring redundant 
hardware or by calling in system experts.
B. Network-Control-Operations at GSOC
The  German  Space  Operation  Center,  GSOC,  serves  as  control  center  for  the  European  module  of  the 
international  space  station,  Columbus  (Col-CC),  and  as  ground  control  center  for  satellite  missions  of  DLR, 
missions in international partnership and if needed also as host for projects of external agencies or customers. In  
addition to the control center for the space segment of a mission, GSOC operates as control center for the whole  
ground-segment of space missions run by DLR or other partners. As such, the main task of GSOC is to ensure and 
coordinate the correct configuration of the ground segment, that is to provide real-time and offline connections for 
data exchange between the worldwide net of ground stations and the satellite control center, be it located at GSOC 
as well or externally somewhere else. GSOC is specialized to serve as control center during LEOP operations, but it  
also controls  LEO-  and  GEO-satellites  throughout  their  complete  life-cycles,  including  de-orbiting.  GSOC has 
especially developed unique knowledge in flying satellites in close formation by operating the projects TerrarSAR  
and TanDEM.
An outstanding  feature  of  GSOC is,  that  it  serves  as  control  center  for  manned spaceflight  as  well  as  for  
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unmanned satellite missions.  That way,  any mission hosted at GSOC can benefit  from the experience and – if 
allowed by the safety regulations of  the missions in question – the existing infrastructure,  which was build in 
accordance with the rigid requirements for ESA's Columbus module at  the ISS. To make maximum use of the  
potential  synergies  in such a multi-mission environment,  GSOC stepwise changes its complete IT-infrastructure  
from a server-based design to virtual machines. This development has an direct impact to operations, the task to 
properly manage and monitor the connections of the ground segment. Hardware failures or not-available services on 
the hardware (e.g. FTP etc.) may now have impact to several missions. From the view point of a network-control  
operator (NC), now there are two different layers of monitoring to watch: The (mission specific) software running 
on virtual hosts and the (mission independent) physical host underneath. As pointed out, depending on the regime an 
error occurs in, the consequences differ completely.
As for ground station operations in Weilheim, the particular setup at GSOC's department for “Communication 
and Ground-Station” defines the way, NC operations at GSOC is accomplished. It also sets requirements for the  
tools in use to do so:
• Serving as central node for ground segments with connections to stations all over the world, GSOC has to 
be available for 24/7, not only for some scheduled passes. Consequently the IT-infrastructure is highly 
redundant  and  clustered  such,  that  outages  of  single  elements  are  covered  by  automated  redundancy 
switching or alternative routing, and so on.
• Although the  operators  do  have  a  basic  tool-kit  to  restart  servers  and  services,  the  main task  for  the 
operators is not that much to do trouble-shooting but to communicate the situation. Connected projects and  
stations might  have to be informed about  the use of  alternative  data routing.  And even if  the service  
provided by GSOC is still available, system experts have to be called in to bring the system back to full  
redundancy.
C. A Common Framework for M&C-Tasks: SpACE
With  the  need  to  implement  a  new  M&C software  for  the  Weilheim ground  station,  it  was  realized  that  
controlling the network infrastructure  of  GSOC places  a  similar  set  of  requirements  – similar  at  least  in type. 
Although the hardware to be configured and monitored differs completely,  the setup is always the same as it is  
sketched in Fig. 1. Information is needed to be collected from the hardware, and must be processed by the M&C in a 
way that it can be passed to a command instance, be it a human operator or some automated system. Vice versa, the 
command  instance  can  decide  about  necessary  actions  from  the  available  information  and  pass  the  resulting 
commands to the hardware through the M&C. Following this generalization, a generic framework for M&C-tasks  
was developed at GSOC. Details about this framework named SpACE and the applications build on it, have already 
been presented.1
One of the main tasks of any M&C-system is, to 
process  the  collected  information  and  thus  display  a 
summarized  pictured  to  the  command  instance.  The 
same  is  true  in  the  other  direction:  High  level 
commands or predefined command sequences have to 
be  selected  easily  by  the  command instance  and  the 
M&C-system shall “unpack” these directives and send 
the  corresponding  set  of  low-level  commands  to  the 
various pieces of hardware building up the system.
A key feature of the SpACE-framework is not to 
separate  internally  between  those  various  layers  of 
information.  A low-level  value  of  a  single  setting at 
some  device  is  handled  in  the  very  same  way  as  a 
summarized parameter deduced from a bundle of low-
level inputs. The first consequence of the fact that all 
bits  of  information are treated equally is,  there is  no 
information  somewhere  in  the  M&C  that  is  not 
accessible to the command instance. In other words, it 
is not before the interface to the command instance, that information is filtered. Precisely, if the command instance 
is a human operator in front of a GUI-application, it is only due to the GUI and the design of its pictures to filter,  
which information the operator actually sees and which one is skipped. Technically the application “knows” about  
all details, it is just hiding something in order to allow the user to keep the overview.
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Figure1. The general setup of any M&C-system.
M&C
Command instance
D. The Level of Detail – Help or Confusion?
Following the above discussion it is clear that the level of detail displayed to an operator is not a matter of  
technique, it is a matter of organizing the shift. Here the two variables mentioned above – procedures and operator  
training – come together again.
It  is an important point to realize, that these two 
variables do not balance each other  (see Fig. 2).  An 
operator  with  excellent  expertize  is  able  to  work 
almost independent from any procedure – he or she 
just knows what to do. But a lack of expertize is not 
necessarily equalized by good procedures.  In  fact,  a 
fairly well knowledge of the system potentially creates 
a  conflict  between  written  procedures  and  the 
operators  intuition.  The  result  is  most  often  an 
inappropriate  reaction.  But  it  is  not  only the human 
factor,  that  is  raising  the  problem  here  –  also  an 
operator, devoted to stick to the procedures, is lost if 
the procedure is incomplete or unclear.
At the end, there are three quantities that have to 
be adjusted to each other:
1. Display – The operator either must have the 
expertize to interpret the displays he sees, or 
those displays must be described in explicit procedures.
As a consequence, what's neither fully understood by the operator nor covered in procedures must not be 
displayed.
2. Procedures – Everything an operator is supposed to do must be described in procedures. If not, the door is  
open for arbitrary actions based on guessing.
As a consequence, what's not explicitly stated in procedures shall not be expected from operators. There  
should be no such thing like common sense or implicit assumptions.
3. Expertize – The operator  either must blindly stick to the procedures or he has to fully understand the 
impact of his action to the whole system.
The difficulty of this fact is revealed if it is formulated the other way around: The operator has to realize 
the point at which he must stop trying to do the best. It is not easy to step back and do nothing else than  
inform others while the system display alarms and the next support is coming close.
II. Viewing the Same From Different Perspectives
With the growing complexity of the ground segments nowadays it is constantly getting harder to maintain the 
overview. In fact, it is almost impossible to know for any single malfunction at lowest level the impact to the system 
as a whole. Progress like virtualization and the usage of the same hardware for multiple projects in different context 
add  more  and  more  dependencies  to  the  system.  Because  of  this  tendency,  we  decided  at  GSOC to  take  the 
opportunity of  the implementation of  a  new M&C-system to re-define the working point  in terms of  displays,  
procedures and expertize.
A. Sorted by Device versus Sorted by Service
Traditionally, combining information to higher level summaries, is often closely connected to the hardware setup 
of the system. At a ground station for instance, all the detailed information of an HPA is gathered to a single device  
state and furthermore the device states of HPA, frequency-converter and base-band equipment is summarized to a  
high level information about the up-link chain. Following this logic, dependencies between the devices are hard to  
be implemented.
An example: The HPA might not show a low or missing input signal as an error. In fact, adjusting the output  
power to the desired level can be a combined setting at the HPA and some attenuator prior in the chain. On the other 
hand, a low or missing input signal will force any gain-control to drive into its limits. Depending on the type of 
HPA, this can cause severe damage to the hardware.
Of course, such dependencies can be added “artificially” to the next higher level. In our example the combined  
up-link chain would be colored in red signaling the improper configuration, but all underlying devices would be 
green as none of them reports an error. As a result, the displayed error can not be traced to its cause and the situation 
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Figure 2. The achieved quality of service with respect 
to the expertize of an operator and the quality of the 
procedures handed out.
can only be solved, if the operator is experienced enough to understand that it is the combination of two devices  
displayed as “green” that leads to the error.
A  better  way  to 
handle the same situation 
is, to choose a sorting for 
the displays that includes 
the  dependencies 
between devices from the 
very  beginning.  This  is 
realized in WARP in the 
following  way:  The  up-
link  chain  is  not 
understood as the sum of 
its  devices  but as  a  tool 
to fulfill a certain task – 
in  our  example:  Provide 
an RF-signal with a given power level. Now the top-level display summarizes all requirements to be met, in order to 
deliver the expected result. If an alarm is raised, the operator knows instantly which functionality of the system is  
concerned and the navigation from the top-level alarm brings the operator to the list of requirements. There he can  
read off which condition is violated, in our example a missing output at the frequency-converter.
Being used to a pure graphical display showing the hardware components of the antenna, the newly invented list  
display is uncommon to the operators. Right now we are discussing several ways to provide a much more intuitive 
graphical representation of an antenna and its services. But even with the list representation, as shown in Fig.  3, the 
interpretation of an occurred error is much more straightforward since a pair of information is given: The parameter 
that deviates from its normal setting (“UC carrier”) together with the impact to the system (“HPA is not active”). It  
is exactly this combination of cause and consequence, that generates the improvement against the legacy system, as  
for the previous M&C, TIGRIS, it was up to the operator to know (or look up) the impact of an alarm.
B. Color Coding and Time Dependent Monitoring
Another  major  change  for  operations  is  that  the 
displayed  colors  have  different  meanings  in  WARP 
compared to its predecessor. For TIGRIS, the previous 
system,  the  definition  of  “green”  was  the 
configuration expected during a (successful) pass. As 
a consequence, for most of the time, the displays were 
showing a rich variety of colors (See Fig. 4). It was up 
to the operator to know the differences between a pass 
configuration and, let's  say,  a data flow test prior to 
the pass. In fact, during a DFT there had to be many 
alarms as the needed injection of simulated data to the 
down-link is something definitely not wanted during a 
pass.
Now  for  WARP,  the  definition  of  colors  has 
changed  in  the  way,  that  “green”  indicates  the 
configuration  expected  in  the  context  of  the  task 
currently carried out. To specify the context, WARP 
has a state-machine included that keeps track on the 
command sequences run, and hence “knows” what the 
antenna is prepared for. In Fig. 3 this is displayed in 
the two upper most lines above the table: The antenna 
is  “Setup for  Mission” and prepared  to  provide up- 
and down-link. One step necessary to configure the antenna in such a way, was to power up the HPA as it is needed  
for up-link. Therefore WARP is aware that the HPA is active and can start to watch the relevant settings to keep the  
device safe. In the example above, that is WARP checks the carrier state at the up-converter.
If the antenna would be operated for down-link only, the HPA would remain off, the antenna state would be  
aware of that and therefore the state of the carrier at the up-converter was irrelevant. This is the formalism utilized in  
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Figure 4. Example  Display  of  TIGRIS. Due  to  the  
color  philosophy  to  define  “green”  as  the  valid  pass  
configuration,  the  main  antenna  display  shows  many  
alarms  although  being  correctly  configured  prior  to  a  
pass.
Figure 3. The List-Display of WARP. In this example, the HPA is supposed to be  
active (“Source”) which requires the carrier at the UC to be ON (“Desired”), while  
the actual setting is OFF (“Value”), reported as ERROR (“Result”).
WARP to vary the display over time and raise alarms only if they are relevant. As a consequence, colors at the GUI 
do no longer non-ambiguously correspond to a distinct setting at the hardware, but displayed alarms in turn always 
are serious.
C. Bottom-Up versus Top-Down
Even more essential is this way of service-oriented display for the other M&C-system based on SpACE, the 
NEMO application at GSOC. Started at the beginning as a pure network-monitoring, it  has quickly grown to a 
complete system-monitoring and -control. Fig. 5 shows a part of the covered hardware. Currently, NEMO monitors 
about 200 servers, physical hosts as well as virtual machines, and about 150 network elements such as switches, 
routers, firewalls and so on. Beside the monitoring, NEMO enables to actively configure the hardware, for example 
stop a service on a host and start it on a different one.
The complete system at the moment is mapped to about 16.000 parameters with about 500 updates per second.  
Most  of  these  parameters  represent  the  system  on  hardware-level.  As  such,  NEMO  is  used  by  the  system-
administrators to analyze problems and trace errors in time. Since NEMO provides command access, this tool is also 
used to do trouble-shooting by the admins. Commanding can also be done by operators, but only using predefined  
command  sequences,  so  called  work-
flows, to reconfigure external interfaces.
In terms of monitoring it is clear, that 
a display as shown in Fig. 5 serves well 
for experts, but it is inappropriate for real-
time operations.  The NC-operator  has  a 
completely different  view to the  system 
and this view is provided by a dedicated 
graphical representation.
Here  again,  the  service-oriented 
approach  is  chosen.  The  essential 
information needed about the network is, 
whether  the  end-to-end  connection 
between  ground  station  and  satellite 
command system is available at all, and if 
a redundant data path is available in case 
of problems. Such an end-to-end view is 
realized as shown in Fig. 6.
At the right-hand side, the WSP-C is 
the  SLE-service-provider2 hosted  by the 
ground station, here Weilheim. From the 
GSOC point of view, the SLE-service has 
to be reachable, but it is not under control 
of GSOC. Therefore there is just a single WSP-C displayed, the active one. The middle row of devices are the SLE-
user hosted at GSOC, the so called SSB. They are setup in a threefold redundancy and as they are locally running at  
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Figure  6:  End-to-end view of  the  connection  between SCC and 
ground station as displayed by NEMO.
Figure 5. Overview of a part of the IT-infrastructure as monitored on device-level by NEMO.
GSOC, all three of them are monitored and displayed. Finally on the left, there are the hosts running the satellite  
command system, SCOS, in the displayed example for the satellites TerrarSAR and TanDEM.
Concerning the network, the WSP-C is located in an operational LAN at Weilheim, while the hosts for SSB and 
SCOS are located within GSOC's multi-mission LAN-segment.  In  the display of Fig.  6 the particular  data path 
through the network components is completely hidden. Again, the important information is the availability of the  
service.
In the regime of network infrastructure, it is almost 
impossible,  to  deduce  the  essential  high-level 
information  (Is  some  host  reachable?)  from  the 
various  low-level  information  of  the  relevant 
components.  Any  operational  LAN-segment  is 
internally  highly  redundant  and  there  is  an 
exponentially growing number of possibilities to route 
an  IP-packet  from  one  host  to  another  (see  for 
example Fig. 7).
The network itself is operational as long as there is 
still  one  possible  way  to  connect  the  two  hosts  to 
communicate.  Instead  of  checking all  possible ways 
from low-level information, it is much more efficient 
to simply check if  the target  host  is  reachable  by a 
Ping. In fact, if some of the ports potentially used for a 
connection are down, it would be overkill to issue a 
warning,  as  it  has  no  impact  to  operations.  Such 
permanently  ignored  warnings  only  lead  to  the  bad 
habit to also ignore warnings that are indeed severe.
Nevertheless,  having  the  more  detailed 
information available in the system enables the system-administrators to realize if the system slowly degrades, long  
before it finally fails. In case of a real failure, it also serves perfectly as starting point for analysis, as it enables the  
admin to localize the breakdown.
D. Specialized Monitoring Tailored to the Projects Needs
There is a small feature in Fig. 6 easily to be missed. The end-to-end 
view includes more than the infrastructure provided by GSOC in the 
multi-mission context.  It  also includes at  the end-points of  the chain 
hardware hosted by the ground station and the projects. A picture like 
Fig. 6 might look alike for any mission, but the hardware at the mission 
specific end-points is always different.
Also different for any mission is the specification, what a project 
wants to have monitored. By now a large variety of probes has been 
developed for NEMO. Among the standard probes for all the typical  
properties  monitored  on  servers  and  customized  probes  dedicated  to 
match special tools in use at GSOC, there is also a native file-based 
interface  that  enables  to  feed  any  piece  of  information  thought  of 
importance into the system. That way, every project is free to define, 
which information is monitored by the shift-operator.
Apart  from the real-time TM/TC-connection discussed above,  we 
are in the process to include also offline services. In the sense of service oriented end-to-end views, such an offline-
monitoring includes the complete chain from the first FTP server delivering the data down to the final data storage.  
Fig. 8 sketches the various scopes, different projects put onto GSOC's IT-infrastructure.
Because the antenna M&C WARP and NEMO are based on the same framework, SpACE, inventions for one of 
the systems can be used for the other without any effort. For instance, the time-dependent monitoring based on a 
state-machine developed for WARP could also be utilized within NEMO. Potentially the “state” can be connected to 
the scheduling, altering the mission dependent monitoring with respect to the visibility of the satellite. Also offline  
activities  like  data  synchronization  between  redundant  storage  areas,  may  creating  additional  load  to  network 
connections,  could be taken into account.  The huge  potential  of  this  development  is  revealed  by the fact  that  
typically it is more a project's problem to precisely define their needs than to realize the technical implementation.
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Figure 7. Detailed  View  of  the  Network-Structure 
between SSB and SCOS.
Figure  8:  Mission  Specific  View  of 
GSOC's Network-Infrastructure.
  GSOC
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III. Automation and Automated Error-Correction
Operating a ground station has,  except for  a few critical  phases like e.g.  a LEOP, become routine.  Ground  
systems are hardened such, that there is no more need to have experts for all devices around all the time. Therefore,  
a consequent step to more efficient operation is automation. An analysis of all passes supported by the Weilheim 
ground station in September and October 2013 has shown, that 95 % of all supports have run smoothly without any 
human interaction for trouble-shooting needed. It's rather easy to have this fraction of passes run automated. But as 
discussed in Section I, GSOC is devoted to provide a successful service even if failures do occur, hence our aim is  
not only automation, it is even more automated error-correction.
As for the interface to human operators, the key decision to be made for connecting an M&C to an automated 
command instance, is the decision on the level of abstraction used, to signal  errors by the M&C. A granularity 
chosen too fine results in a vast number of possible error conditions, impossible to be handled automatically. On the 
other  side,  too much abstraction  leaves  not  enough room for  a  proper  reaction  and  will  flag  too much of  the  
hardware as non-operational  in case of error.  A lesson learned is,  that the device level  – where information is  
grouped along the physical separation of hardware into various devices – is not well suited to define the desired  
level of abstraction. Especially failures of the kind discussed in Section II, resulting from the dependencies between 
several devices, could never be solved automatically that way.
The state engine integrated to WARP seems to be a much better starting point. It  provides several  features  
making it possible to respond to abnormal conditions appropriately:
• The signals can be individually adjusted to the needed level of abstraction. They can be connected to single 
alarms raised by one hardware component as well as to a combination of many low level inputs.
• Well known features can be handled individually,  the reaction can be a real error-correction. Only if a  
correction of the error is not possible or not (yet) implemented, the system has to switch to redundant  
hardware.
• The state  engine can be used as a single interface,  providing all  information needed by the command 
instance for error handling. Therefore all failures are reported by the state engine in a single format.
• In case the automated error correction does not succeed, the remaining failure is signaled within its context 
and the corresponding functionality.  Thus the next instance to address  the problem, a human operator,  
knows immediately, to which extend the system is affected and which parts are still operational.
At the moment, we do a systematic long term analysis of operations at the ground station Weilheim. Based on this  
data  –  precisely  the  occurred  problems,  how they  were  displayed  and  the  operator's  reactions  to  resolve  the 
situations – we are moving forward towards automated operations at Weilheim.
IV. Conclusion
Bringing  the  newly  developed  M&C-tools  to  operation  at  GSOC  and  its  ground  station  at  Weilheim  has 
triggered a significant change in the way operations is performed. Trying to replace a display of “what is there” by a  
monitoring of “what is needed” has lead to a complete change in the way information is displayed at all. On one  
side, the growing complexity of the systems in use produce an increasing amount of data. This is even accelerated  
by the fact that the new M&C-tool has access to parts of the system, not included in the monitoring before. On the  
other  hand,  available  information is  much more  rigid filtered  to  give  the operator  a  chance  to  identify severe  
problems while suppressing less important information.
At the Weilheim ground station, we were able to create a time-dependent monitoring based on a state-machine 
within WARP. This has lead to a different way to display deviations from the nominal configuration such, that 
source and impact of the deviation are shown as once. Besides helping the operator to evaluate the situation, this was 
the key to finally include dependencies  between different  hardware devices  in a consistent manner.  It  was this 
change that  allowed us to  start  not  only the implementation of automation but  also to  realize automated error  
correction.
At GSOC, NEMO has become a powerful tool as well for system administration as for routine 24/7 operations.  
By replacing the monitoring of a bunch of servers by dedicated views tailored to display the services needed by the  
various projects to get their work done, NEMO has demonstrated its power to summarize the essential information.  
It is now possible for the same shift operator to monitor a much larger amount of hardware than before. Also the  
problem to distinguish between real and virtual hardware has vanished by concentrating the monitoring to what a 
hardware is used for. As for the ground station, the evaluation of an alarm has become much easier because this 
alarm does no longer come from some hardware, instead it is raised within the context of a service. The increasing  
acceptance by projects to define precisely what they wish to have monitored and the integration of those needs into  
NEMO proves the huge potential of this new tool.
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Appendix A
Acronym List
AOS Acquisition of Signal
COP Configuration Observation Processor
DFT Data-Flow-Test
DLR German Aerospace Center
ESA European Space Agency
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GEO Geostationary Orbit
GSOC German Space Operations Center
GUI Graphical User Interface
HPA High Power Amplifier
IOT In-Orbit Testing
IP Internet Protocol
LAN Local Area Network
LEO Low Earth Orbit
LEOP Launch and Early Orbit Phase
M&C Monitoring- and Control-System
NC Network-Control
NEMO Network-Monitoring, the new IT-infrastructure M&C at GSOC
RF Radio Frequency
SSB SLE-Switch-Board, the SLE-user in use at GSOC
SLE Space-Link-Extension
TM/TC Telemetry and Telecommand
TT&C Telemetry, Tracking and Command
UC Up-Converter, Frequency-converter to RF
WARP Weilheim Antenna Remote Processing, Weilheim's new M&C-system
WSP-C Weilheim Service Provider for Cortex, the SLE-provider in use at Weilheim
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